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Selective resuscitation refers to the practice of providing resuscitative efforts
to one or some (but not all) infants born in the setting of multiple
gestation. When one fetus is known to have a severe anomaly or severe
growth restriction, parents are sometimes offered this option. In the setting
of extreme prematurity, in the absence of an anomaly or severe growth
restriction, parents are generally expected to make one uniﬁed decision for
all the infants involved. The introduction of the Outcome Estimator, a tool
that provides the ability to make individual outcome predictions for each
fetus in a multiple gestation at borderline gestational age, based on
contributing variables such as weight and gender, has led to the ethical
dilemma of whether parents in this setting should also be offered the option
of selective resuscitation. No convincing ethical argument for denying the
parents the right to decide for each individual infant is apparent.
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Introduction
The question as to whether to provide resuscitative efforts at
borderline gestational age has for many years been acknowledged
as a difﬁcult ethical dilemma, with neonatologists commonly
deferring to informed parents in this situation. That is, once the
risks of death and disability have been reviewed, neonatologists
commonly respect parental preference as to whether aggressive
resuscitative measures should be instituted. Selective resuscitation,
here deﬁned as the resuscitation of one or some (but not all)
infants born from a multiple gestation, has sometimes been
requested by parents and carried out by neonatologists. This may
occur, for example, when one twin has an anomaly that carries an
extremely poor prognosis. Selective resuscitation, in the absence of
a signiﬁcant anomaly or profound growth restriction, has generally
not been a consideration in multiple gestations at borderline
gestational age.
Our increasing (though still imperfect) ability to provide a
quantitative prognosis at borderline gestational age for each
individual fetus raises the possibility that parents may request
selective resuscitation more often. Such a situation has in fact
arisen in our Newborn Intensive Care Unit, has led to a great deal
of discussion, and will likely recur here and elsewhere. What
follows is a case scenario based on (though not identical to) what
occurred, followed by an analysis of the question: Should
neonatologists comply with a parental request for selective
resuscitation in the setting of extreme prematurity?
Case presentation
A prenatal consultation was performed for parents with discordant
gender twins at 23 weeks gestational age. The mother had
presented to her obstetrician earlier that day in preterm labor, and
was admitted to the hospital for monitoring and the administration
of antenatal corticosteroids. At 23 weeks gestation, given the
relatively high likelihood of a poor outcome, the practice at our
institution, consistent with American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP)
guidelines,
1 is to permit parents to make an informed decision as
to whether or not they wish to have resuscitative efforts initiated
after birth.
Utilizing the on-line Outcome Estimator recently made
available by the National Institute of Child Health and Human
Development’s (NICHD) Neonatal Research Network,
2 the chances
of survival and disability were presented to the family. The
likelihood of survival for the female twin, who had an estimated
fetal weight of 650 g, was predicted to be 51%, with a likelihood of
survival without profound impairment of 35%. For the male twin,
who had an estimated fetal weight of 510g, the predicted likelihood
of survival and survival without profound impairment was 24%
and 13%, respectively. The parents were asked to consider this
information so that a decision to either withhold or initiate
postnatal resuscitation could soon be made in collaboration with
the medical team.
Several hours later, the parents were asked whether or not they
had reached a decision, to which they responded, ‘‘Yes. Based
on what you have told us, we would like you to resuscitate our
daughter, but not our son.’’ This unforeseen parental request
resulted in deliberation among the neonatology section as to
whether resuscitation could ethically be offered to one twin but
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request, and after much discussion, it was decided that their
request should not be agreed to. The parents would have to make
one choice for both twins, either to withhold or provide
resuscitation and intensive care measures. When this was presented
to the parents, their response without objection was to request
resuscitative efforts for both twins, which were carried out.
Resuscitation in the ‘Gray Zone’
The pediatric profession has widely acknowledged that there exists
a certain ‘gray zone’ of gestational ages, wherein it is not clear
whether resuscitation should be attempted, because of the high
likelihood of death or disability. Within that gray zone, it has been
recommended that informed parents be permitted to choose. There
is some variation in opinion regarding the exact location of the
margins of the gray zone, but in the United States and the United
Kingdom, at least, 23 weeks generally falls within it. Both the AAP
and the Nufﬁeld Council have recommended that, at 23 weeks, the
decision as to whether to attempt resuscitation should be deferred
to the parents.
1,3
When counseling parents regarding the impending delivery of
an extremely preterm newborn, neonatologists have generally
provided prognostic information based on the best obstetrical
estimate of gestational age and/or the estimated fetal weight.
Sometimes, it may be divulged that females at extremely low birth
weight tend to have better outcomes than males, and/or that
antenatal steroids improve the chances of intact survival. Until
recently, however, the effects of these additional factors have not
typically been quantiﬁed during counseling.
The past year has seen a major advance in the availability of
prognostic information, as a result of the work of Tyson et al.
4 and
the NICHD. They developed an on-line calculator for estimating the
likelihood of survival and disability, using data from 4446 infants
born from 22 to 25 weeks gestation over a 6-year period. Rather
than basing these determinations on gestational age or birth
weight alone, predicted outcomes are calculated based on
gestational age, birth weight, gender, receipt of antenatal steroids
and single versus multiple gestation, each of which has been
shown to inﬂuence outcome. The Outcome Estimator is of course
not perfect, and numerical likelihoods need to be considered in
that light, but it nevertheless represents a major step forward in the
effort to provide parents with information to assist with these most
difﬁcult decisions.
Tyson and others have rightly pointed out that, with the
availability of these data and the Outcome Estimator, basing
resuscitation decisions on gestational age alone no longer seems
appropriate.
4,5 For example, it can be seen through use of this
database that a 23-week, 610-g singleton female who received
antenatal steroids is twice as likely to survive as a 24-week, 520-g
twin male without the beneﬁt of antenatal steroids (predicted
survival 41% vs 19%). Given that information, it would make little
sense to decide upon resuscitation, or the limits of parental
authority, based on gestational age alone. It is this ability to be
more speciﬁc in prognosis, and in particular to provide a separate
prognosis for each twin, that has brought forward the ethical
question of selective resuscitation in multiple gestation.
Ethical considerations in selective resuscitation
Selective resuscitation is not a new concept, nor an unheard of
practice. Many neonatologists and parents have been faced with
this consideration, for example, in the case of a signiﬁcant
congenital anomaly diagnosed prenatally in one twin.
Furthermore, many who object to selective resuscitation in the case
presented would consider it acceptable in other situations, such as
extremely premature twins in which one is markedly hydropic and
the other apparently normal. This new dilemma, however, brings
into sharper focus the importance of gender in the outcome. The
parental request faced by neonatologists may no longer be limited
to ‘Save the larger one,’ or ‘Save the normal one,’ but rather ‘Save
the girl.’ Indeed, parents might request selective resuscitation in
extremely premature twins where the only known difference is
gender.
The response by the neonatologists when confronted with the
case at hand was that it seemed unacceptable to resuscitate the girl
but not the boy. Selective resuscitation, at least on that basis,
seemed inappropriate, though the neonatologists had difﬁculty
identifying why. Although the moral intuitions of experienced
clinicians should carry signiﬁcant weight, they cannot stand alone
as an ethical justiﬁcation for overruling the parents’ right to
informed consent for each of their children. In addition, these
intuitions may be inconsistent with our judgments under
analogous circumstances. Consider, for example, if these two
23-week siblings were born not as twins but to the same parents,
one year apart. It would be acceptable to many neonatologists (and
consistent with professional guidelines) to defer to parental
discretion in each case and, if requested, to resuscitate one sibling
but not the other. What would be the difference, ethically speaking,
between these two situations? Why do we ﬁnd parental discretion
morally acceptable in one situation but not the other? Perhaps the
best approach would be to examine what makes parental discretion
generally acceptable at 23 weeks.
At least two justiﬁcations are commonly invoked for allowing
parental discretion. The ﬁrst is an appeal to the ‘best interests’
argument, which essentially weighs the anticipated beneﬁts and
burdens to the child of the proposed treatment (in this case,
resuscitation and ongoing intensive care). In this setting, there is
an assumption that the child’s best interest is a very difﬁcult and
subjective assessment, laden with value judgments, and in such
cases the values and judgment of parents should generally prevail.
6
Beyond the margins of the gray zone, wherein the child’s best
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That is, below some minimal gestational age the burdens of
resuscitation and intensive care clearly outweigh the possible
beneﬁts, and above some point the beneﬁts clearly outweigh the
burdens. In each of these settings, neonatologists do not give
parents a choice regarding resuscitation. But when there is a
signiﬁcant degree of uncertainty regarding the balance of beneﬁts
and burdens, deference to parental wishes seems appropriate, and
is widely recommended.
7
The second justiﬁcation for parental discretion often cited is that
the parents, more than the physicians or others (except perhaps the
child him/herself), will bear the burden of the decision. Should the
child survive with severe disability, for example, this could have a
profound impact on their marriage, their other children, their
ﬁnancial stability and other aspects of their lives as well. There are
at least two problems with this argument. First, some parents do
not assume ultimate responsibility for the child’s care, leaving it
instead to relatives or others. Second, it is not clear that concerns
about the burdens to family should be allowed to trump concerns
about the child’s own best interests. The validity of this justiﬁcation
and its counter-arguments are beyond the scope of this essay, and
in any case are not essential to this analysis. The relevant point for
this discussion is not whether these justiﬁcations are valid, but
rather whether they are applicable when the two children are born
one year apart, but not (or less so) when they are born as twins.
No such difference is apparent. Therefore, even if one were to
recognize the validity of this justiﬁcation for allowing parental
discretion, it does not provide a reason to give parents a choice in
one setting but not the other.
There is no clear evidence that either of these justiﬁcations
applies less to twins than to singletons born one year apart. The
justiﬁcations for allowing (or in fact requiring) parental choice
appear to apply equally to the two situations. If we can identify no
morally relevant difference between these scenarios, then there
appears to be no moral rationale for allowing parents to decide for
each infant in one setting but not the other.
Perhaps if the parents’ decision had been based on what the
physicians considered an inappropriate motive, it might serve as a
reason to deny their request. For example, if the request to attempt
resuscitation for their daughter, but not their son, was based on
gender preference, this could seem unacceptable based on the
principle of justice or fairness.
8 Justice requires that equals be
treated equally, and if we are to treat patients differently we need to
identify a morally relevant difference. Gender alone does not seem
to qualify as a morally relevant difference. However, the parental
decision in this case did not appear to be based simply on a
preference for a daughter rather than a son. Rather, their request
for selective resuscitation appears to have been based on prognosis,
just as for extremely preterm twins when one has hydrops. The
prognostic information was presented to them by the neonatologist,
presumably for the purpose of reaching their decision. Therefore we
can hardly fault them, or restrict their right to decide, for basing
their decision on that information.
Justice and the counter-argument
If justice requires us (and perhaps the parents as well) to identify a
morally relevant difference in order to treat the two infants
differently, then the question is whether prognosis can itself be seen
as morally relevant to the decision to resuscitate. Physicians, and
neonatologists speciﬁcally, have generally (and rightly) concluded
that it is. For example, in the AAP Textbook on Neonatal
Resuscitation, situations wherein resuscitation may ethically be
withheld are those with poor prognoses.
1 Physicians may differ on
the speciﬁcs of how poor a prognosis must be to justify withholding
a given treatment, but few would argue that prognosis is not
relevant to the decision. This, in the ﬁnal analysis, is why we ﬁnd it
acceptable to withhold resuscitation in certain situations, such as
21 weeks gestation or Trisomy 13, and why many neonatologists
would also ﬁnd it acceptable to resuscitate a normal infant born at
23 weeks while at the same time not resuscitating his hydropic
twin. Prognosis is a morally relevant difference. Thus it would
appear that treating twins differently based on prognosis is not
contrary to the principle of justice. A consideration based on justice
or fairness to the parents may, in fact, have been not only to permit
selective resuscitation in the case described, but perhaps even to
require it if the parents so request.
Prognosis, relevant differences and thresholds
If we accept that a difference in prognosis justiﬁes different
approaches to resuscitation, we still need to consider how much
different the prognosis has to be in order to be relevant. Selective
resuscitation would be justiﬁed only once that threshold has been
exceeded. If one twin were predicted to have a 24% chance of
survival and the other a 21% chance, for example, it would not
seem like a signiﬁcant difference. On the other hand, if size were so
discordant and/or a critical anomaly were known such that one
twin had a 50% chance of survival and the other less than 5%, this
seems different enough to allow different treatment. What, then,
should be the threshold of difference in prognosis needed to justify
different treatment?
The answer is not clear. One possible approach would be to
determine the minimum difference based on the margin of error of
the tools. Such an approach, however, might tell us if the
difference in predicted outcomes is statistically signiﬁcant, but
would not tell us whether it is clinically or morally signiﬁcant.
Ultimately, locating the threshold will be a difﬁcult and subjective
decision, and needs to be recognized as such. But simply
recognizing that there is some threshold, even if we are unable to
agree on its exact location, leads us to the acknowledgment that, in
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resuscitation choices for their twins.
Conclusion
Selective resuscitation based on prognosis is not a new idea, though
previously it has largely been restricted to scenarios involving
multiple gestation where one infant was known to have a minimal
chance of survival. With the availability of the NICHD Outcome
Estimator, however, neonatologists will now have prognostic
information available for each twin, which may differ signiﬁcantly
based solely on differences in size and/or gender. There is now a
consensus in the medical, legal and ethical literature that at
borderline gestational age parents have the right to choose whether
or not to resuscitate. In the case of multiple gestation, if there is a
signiﬁcant difference in prognosis between infants, then treating
them differently with regard to resuscitation does not violate that
consensus, nor is it a violation of the principle of justice. Moreover,
there is no apparent ethical justiﬁcation for denying the parents
the right to choose individually for each child. This may present an
unpleasant and awkward situation for the clinical team, but that
fact alone is not sufﬁcient justiﬁcation for denying the parents a
right that they are generally accorded when making decisions at
borderline gestational age.
For those who consider selective resuscitation of twins based on
prognosis to be unacceptable, the task then remains to identify the
ethical justiﬁcation for denying the parents their right to decide for
each child.
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